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Abstract
The use of novel health information technology provides avenues for potentially significant patient benefit. 
However, it is also timely to take a step back and to consider whether the use of these technologies is safe 
– or more precisely what the current evidence for their safety is, and what kinds of evidence we should 
be looking for in order to create a convincing argument for patient safety. This special issue on patient 
safety includes eight papers that demonstrate an increasing focus on qualitative approaches and a growing 
recognition that the sociotechnical lens of examining health information technology–associated change 
is important. We encourage a balanced approach to technology adoption that embraces innovation, but 
nonetheless insists upon suitable concerns for safety and evaluation of outcomes.
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Introduction
Populations are ageing, with an increasing number of people living with long-term conditions. 
Simultaneously, healthcare is becoming increasingly complex with an ever-growing range of diag-
nosis and treatment options. Health information technology (HIT) can make care safer and more 
efficient, but it can also have unanticipated consequences and contribute to adverse events.1–4 
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However, the pace with which novel technologies are entering health services and the scale of 
change that they bring with them are unprecedented. Therefore, there is a need to monitor develop-
ments carefully and mitigate risks where they arise. In particular, there is currently a strong inter-
national interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to revolutionise the way care is delivered.5 
While only at the beginning of this development, the achievements with AI in healthcare have been 
remarkable, albeit mainly in specific areas such as identifying pathologies through images, and 
mainly when augmenting as opposed to replacing human activities.6–8 In the future, AI systems 
might move beyond offering advice to clinicians and patients and take decisions independently. 
For example, autonomous infusion pumps might determine appropriate infusion rates or decide 
when to take a patient off medication without input from a doctor.9 However, empirical evidence 
shows that although AI systems tend to perform well in designated tasks, integration into complex 
sociotechnical environments (including a range of human stakeholders with different interests and 
other technologies) is still challenging. This may be partly due to HIT currently being in a transi-
tionary period where a mix of old and new practices and artefacts exist, with the old being gradu-
ally replaced by the new.
These are exciting developments, and the use of novel HIT provides avenues for potentially 
significant patient benefit. However, it is also timely to take a step back and to consider whether 
the use of these technologies is safe – or more precisely what the current evidence for their safety 
is, and what kinds of evidence we should be looking for in order to create a convincing argument 
for patient safety. This is further complicated by the nature of innovation, where there is often a 
tension between the need for evidence of effectiveness and the drive for fast-paced technological 
innovation.
Evaluation of technology and evaluation of services
Independent evaluation studies are undertaken still too infrequently. This independent scrutiny is 
critical, because experience has shown that where there is an independent evaluation, the headline 
figures suggested by studies by technology developers are often over-optimistic.10 For example, an 
independent evaluation of 23 patient-facing symptom checkers found that the correct diagnosis 
was listed as the most probable one in only around one-third of the test cases.11 Health informatics 
evaluations are seldom replicated12 and often do not follow good practice in reliable measurement 
of outcomes.13 Formative evaluations that can help to shape developments and mitigate risks asso-
ciated with new applications are also done far too infrequently, and where they exist, they are often 
misaligned with commercial and political timescales. As a result, formative insights may fail to 
inform concurrent decision-making and thereby not allow to mitigate risks.
Reliability and accuracy of HIT are important, but what all stakeholders need to know is whether 
the use of technology to deliver care is safe. Reliability figures by themselves do not allow predic-
tion of what will happen when technology is integrated into social and clinical systems, when, for 
example, a clinician is confronted with a confusing user interface, an opportunity to interact with 
technology that was not foreseen or a digital workflow that impacts upon established team relation-
ships and task management.
Understanding and evaluating these issues requires a sociotechnical rather than a technology-
driven approach.14 It has been argued that the expected rigour of undertaking evaluation should not 
be lowered for HIT, and for digital products, more generally, when compared with traditional 
interventions, and new types of clinical trial designs have been proposed.15 HIT is difficult to 
evaluate because it is often associated with transformation and wider organisational and social 
changes, so it is harder to establish a baseline for comparison and to demonstrate a direct impact.16 
One might add to that the need to complement clinical trials with rigorous mixed-methods 
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approaches and realist evaluation studies17 that are well suited to provide evidence about whether, 
how and under what circumstances new technologies can contribute to the quality and safety of 
care delivered to patients.18 There is an increasing awareness of the value of such studies among 
health services researchers and policy makers, but there is still much dialogue and education 
required to build a shared awareness between technology implementers and evaluators. This could, 
for example, be achieved through teaching formative sociotechnical evaluation methods to HIT 
implementers, by making academic tools more user-friendly and by requiring evaluation plans to 
be explicit and funded in project business cases. There are obvious common interests between HIT 
implementers and healthcare quality improvement teams, which perhaps have not yet been widely 
integrated in organisational programmes.
The contribution of the papers in this special issue
As the papers in this special issue illustrate, there is an increasing focus on qualitative approaches 
and a growing recognition that the sociotechnical lens of examining HIT-associated change is 
important.
Sittig et al.19 provide a review of nine key challenges for the safety of HIT that need to be 
addressed in the short to medium term. They structure these challenges around design and develop-
ment, implementation and use, and monitoring, evaluation and optimisation. They usefully describe 
this structure as safe technology, safe use of technology and use of technology to improve safety. 
This approach demonstrates how the sociotechnical systems perspective moves beyond simplistic 
technology-focused evaluations of HIT.
The paper by Dean Franklin and Puaar20 describes the result of a stepped wedge study of the 
impact of introducing electronic prescribing on prescribing errors in one hospital with 20 wards. 
The study nicely demonstrates the importance of having a robust study design that allows a nuanced 
analysis of the effect of technology on process and outcome measures. This study has a quantitative 
design, but the authors argue that further qualitative research is required in order to fully under-
stand how and why HIT changes practice and outcomes.
Such a complementary approach is demonstrated in the paper by Furniss et al.21 Their paper 
describes findings from a qualitative study of a closed-loop smart pump system in one intensive 
care unit. The paper illustrates how the technology can both contribute to and compromise patient 
safety. This qualitative, sociotechnical analysis of work-as-done supports our understanding of the 
impact of the introduction of technology on patient safety.
Ash et al.22 provide further qualitative insights into how HIT is used and by whom. Their paper 
describes the findings of a qualitative study that aimed to identify what kinds of activities are per-
formed within healthcare provider organisations to ensure electronic health record (EHR) safety. 
Based on interviews with 91 participants from six organisations, they describe the different types 
of activities that appear to be important for ensuring EHR safety from an organisational perspec-
tive. A key insight that comes from the paper is the suggestion that we should understand EHR 
safety not simply as a technical issue but analyse, measure and improve it at different levels.
The contributions by Habli et al.23 and by Igene and Johnson24 demonstrate how sociotechnical 
analysis of HIT can be undertaken proactively during design and reactively in case an adverse 
event or incident has taken place. Habli et al. describe the development and piloting of a software-
supported approach to the proactive risk identification and risk analysis of Health IT products. This 
SMART (Safety Modelling, Assurance and Reporting Toolset) tool was applied to the study of an 
electronic prescribing and allergy management system. This proactive tool is intended to facilitate 
the application of National Health Service (NHS) Digital safety standards by incorporating the 
logic of the standards into the tool. Igene and Johnson describe the application of four different 
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analysis methods to identify factors that contribute to adverse events. These approaches have been 
in used in other industries, and their value in healthcare is assessed in this paper.
AI is the topic of the final two papers in this special issue. Evans et al.25 report the automatic 
analysis of 31,000 patient safety incident reports from primary care settings. They use three differ-
ent machine learning approaches for comparison. The aim was to automatically classify incident 
type and severity. Such an AI-driven approach could help with processing the large amounts of 
safety data that is generated by healthcare organisations, and lessons could be identified that apply 
across providers. The paper by Vehí et al.26 demonstrates the potential positive effect on patient 
safety of using AI and machine learning approaches. They describe the application of machine 
learning to the prediction of hypoglycaemic events in type 1 diabetic patients. While the proposed 
system is a pilot study, the paper illustrates what personalised care supported by AI could look like. 
There are challenges around the validation of such an approach, and testing it in real life, because 
as previous papers have shown, the introduction of technology might have unanticipated effects or 
might need to consider factors other than those included in the original study.
Integration of patient safety into digital health innovations
The papers included in this issue exemplify the range of existing HIT applications and the challenges 
associated with evaluating their impact on safety, either directly or indirectly through changing the 
way organisations, teams and individuals operate. We can see that there are now a range of estab-
lished applications that have paved the way for the development of frameworks that can guide assess-
ments of the range of dimensions that are likely to impact safety. These now need to be applied 
prospectively to newer applications that currently operate in settings with a limited number of social 
actors. There is political and commercial pressure to make a ‘leap of faith’ that technology will pro-
vide sufficient benefits to outweigh the risks of untried changes in clinical work. There are already 
cases where it may legitimately be considered unsafe not to adopt technical solutions, but there are 
also many situations where to do so simply because of technology push would be unwise and unethi-
cal. We encourage a balanced approach that embraces innovation, but nonetheless insists upon suit-
able concerns for safety and evaluation of outcomes.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Mark Sujan  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6895-946X
References
 1. Ash JS, Sittig DF, Dykstra RH, et al. Categorizing the unintended sociotechnical consequences of com-
puterized provider order entry. Int J Med Inform 2007; 76(Suppl. 1): S21–S27.
 2. Koppel R, Metlay JP, Cohen A, et al. Role of computerized physician order entry systems in facilitating 
medication errors. JAMA 2005; 293(10): 1197–1203.
 3. Brenner SK, Kaushal R, Grinspan Z, et al. Effects of health information technology on patient outcomes: 
a systematic review. J Am Med Inform Assn 2016; 23(5): 1016–1036.
 4. Kim MO, Coiera E and Magrabi F. Problems with health information technology and their effects on 
care delivery and patient outcomes: a systematic review. J Am Med Inform Assn 2017; 24(2): 246–250.
Sujan et al. 5
 5. Coiera E. The fate of medicine in the time of AI. Lancet 2018; 392(10162): 2331–2332.
 6. Esteva A, Kuprel B, Novoa RA, et al. Dermatologist-level classification of skin cancer with deep neural 
networks. Nature 2017; 542: 115–118.
 7. Gulshan V, Peng L, Coram M, et al. Development and validation of a deep learning algorithm for detec-
tion of diabetic retinopathy in retinal fundus photographs. JAMA 2016; 316(22): 2402–2410.
 8. Saria S, Butte A and Sheikh A. Better medicine through machine learning: what’s real, and what’s arti-
ficial? PLoS Med 2018; 15(12): e10002721.
 9. Sujan M, Furniss D, Embrey D, et al. Critical barriers to safety assurance and regulation of autonomous 
medical systems. In: Proceedings of the 29th European safety and reliability conference (ESREL 2019) 
(ed M Beer and E Zio), Hannover, 22–26 September 2019.
 10. Garg AX, Adhikari NKJ, McDonald H, et al. Effects of computerized clinical decision support systems on 
practitioner performance and patient outcomes: a systematic review. JAMA 2005; 293(10): 1223–1238.
 11. Semigran HL, Linder JA, Gidengil C, et al. Evaluation of symptom checkers for self diagnosis and tri-
age: audit study. BMJ 2015; 351: h3480.
 12. Coiera E, Ammenwerth E, Georgiou A, et al. Does health informatics have a replication crisis? J Am 
Med Inform Assn 2018; 25(8): 963–968.
 13. Scott PJ, Brown AW, Adedeji T, et al. A review of measurement practice in studies of clinical decision 
support systems 1998–2017. J Am Med Inform Assn. Epub ahead of print 16 April 2019. DOI: 10.1093/
jamia/ocz035.
 14. Carayon P, Hundt AS, Karsh B, et al. Work system design for patient safety: the SEIPS model. BMJ 
Qual Saf 2006; 15(Suppl. 1): i50–i58.
 15. Greaves F, Joshi I, Campbell M, et al. What is an appropriate level of evidence for a digital health inter-
vention? Lancet 2018; 392(10165): 2665–2667.
 16. Catwell L and Sheikh A. Evaluating eHealth interventions: the need for continuous systemic evaluation. 
PLoS Med 2009; 6(8): e1000126.
 17. Pawson R and Tilley N. Realistic evaluation. London: SAGE, 1997.
 18. Griffiths FE, Bryce C, Cave JA, et al. Timely digital patient-clinician communication in specialist NHS 
clinical services serving young people: findings from a mixed methods study (The LYNC study). J Med 
Internet Res 2017; 19: e102.
 19. Sittig DF, Wright A, Coiera E, et al. Current challenges in health information technology-related patient 
safety. Health Inform J. Epub ahead of print 11 December 2018. DOI: 10.1177/1460458218814893.
 20. Franklin BD and Puaar S. What is the impact of introducing inpatient electronic prescribing on prescrib-
ing errors? A naturalistic stepped wedge study in an English teaching hospital. Health Inform J. Epub 
ahead of print 18 March 2019. DOI: 10.1177/1460458219833112.
 21. Furniss D, Dean Franklin B and Blandford A. The devil is in the detail: how a closed-loop documentation 
system for IV infusion administration contributes to and compromises patient safety. Health Inform J. 
Epub ahead of print 15 April 2019. DOI: 10.1177/1460458219839574.
 22. Ash JS, Singh H, Wright A, et al. Essential activities for electronic health record safety: a qualitative 
study. Health Inform J. Epub ahead of print 8 March 2019. DOI: 10.1177/1460458219833109.
 23. Habli I, Jia Y, White S, et al. Development and piloting of a software tool to facilitate proactive hazard 
and risk analysis of Health Information Technology. Health Inform J. Epub ahead of print 5 June 2019. 
DOI: 10.1177/1460458219852789.
 24. Igene OO and Johnson C. Analysis of medication dosing error related to Computerised Provider Order 
Entry system: a comparison of ECF, HFACS, STAMP and AcciMap approaches. Health Inform J. Epub 
ahead of print 16 July 2019. DOI: 10.1177/1460458219859992.
 25. Evans HP, Anastasiou A, Edwards A, et al. Automated classification of primary care patient safety inci-
dent report content and severity using supervised machine learning (ML) approaches. Health Inform J. 
Epub ahead of print 7 March 2019. DOI: 10.1177/1460458219833102.
 26. Vehí J, Contreras I, Oviedo S, et al. Prediction and prevention of hypoglycaemic events in type-1 
diabetic patients using machine learning. Health Inform J. Epub ahead of print 13 June 2019. DOI: 
10.1177/1460458219850682.
